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ConstructionRisk.com Report
http://www.ConstructionRisk.com
Vol. 12, No. 2, February 2010
______________
Inside
This Issue:
•
Consultant’s
Duty to Defend Under a Contract with Developer Arises At the Time of
Tender Despite the Lack of a Finding of Negligence Against the
Consultant.
• Contractor
Can Sue Architect on Quantum Meruit Basis Where no Contract Exists
• Statute
of Limitations for Negligence Actions Bars Suit against Engineer that
was based on Breach of Contract Allegations.
• When
Does a Notice from Client Become a Claim that Must be Reported to
Insurance Carrier?
• Economic
Loss Doctrine in Pennsylvania Bars Owner’s Negligence Claim against
Designers and Construction Subcontractors.
======================================
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Article
1
__________
Consultant’s
Duty to Defend Under a Contract with Developer Arises At the Time of
Tender Despite the Lack of a Finding of Negligence Against the
Consultant.
By: Gordon
& Rees, LLP
The California Court of
Appeals issued an important opinion regarding UDC v CH2M
Hill affecting construction professionals. The decision is the first
of its kind to interpret a design professional's duty to defend under an
indemnity agreement in light of the California Supreme Court's recent
decision in Crawford v. Weathershield.
In short, the court concluded that CH2 Hill (CH2M) was obligated
to defend the project developer despite the fact a jury did not find any
negligence on the design professional's part. The court's conclusion was
based on the fact that the professional services agreement between the
parties provided that CH2M Hill would "defend any suit, action
or demand brought against Developer or Owner on any claim or demand
covered herein" to the extent it arose out of or was in any way
connected with any negligent act or omission by CH2M. UDC-Universal
Development, L.P. v. CH2MM Hill,
2010 DJDAR 794
Under the court's
interpretation, the duty to defend arose at such time as the homeowners'
association made claims implicating CH2M’s work. The court further
found that the indemnity provision in question did not require an
underlying claim of negligence directed specifically against CH2M in
order to trigger a defense obligation, and that the obligation was not
excused by virtue of the jury's exoneration of CH2M on the negligence
claim. The court also determined that it was appropriate to apply Crawford retroactively.
Due to the finding of no negligence, however, CH2M would not have any
duty to indemnify the developer.
Developer UDC and CH2M Hill
entered into two contracts in which CH2M was to provide consulting
services in the development of a residential project. The homeowner’s
association (HOA) sued UDC for property damages resulting from defective
conditions at the project, due in part to negligent planning and design.
Subsequently, UDC cross-complained against several subcontractors,
including CH2M, and tendered its defense to all cross-defendant’s
based on their contracts with UDC. CH2M rejected UDC’s tender, and
thereafter UDC sought reimbursement for costs associated with its
defense. CH2M claimed that its contracts with UDC did not require a
defense because 1) negligence on behalf of CH2M was not asserted in the
HOA’s complaint, 2) nor was it established in UDC’s action. Further,
CH2M argued UDC’s cross-complaint was barred due to the illegality of
the contract based on UDC’s lack of a “Class A” contractor’s
license. CH2M also sought review of the Court’s refusal to award
attorneys fees to CH2M based on the developer’s failure to comply with
California’s Certificate of Merit statute, CCP§411.35. (See footnote
1)
The Appellate Court first
addressed CH2M’s argument that it only had a duty to defend UDC
against the HOA’s lawsuit if a claim against UDC was based on CH2M’s
negligence. CH2M’s contract with UDC stated in part that:
Consultant shall indemnify…Developer…from and
against any and all claims…to the extent they arise out of or are
in any way connected with any negligent act or omission by Consultant…Consultant
agrees, at his own expense, and upon written request by Developer or
Owner of the Subject Property, to defend any suit, action or
demand brought against Developer or Owner on any claim or demand covered
herein. (Emphasis added).
CH2M argued that under the
contract, it had a duty to indemnify UDC only if it was
found negligent in performing its work and a duty to defend only when
the HOA alleged a claim that directly implicated CH2M.
The Court agreed that the
“negligent act or omission” language shielded CH2M from a duty to
indemnify, as that duty was dependant upon a finding of negligence.
However, following Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg. Inc., the
Court construed the duty to defend provision as requiring CH2M to defend
"any suit, action or demand" against UDC insofar as it was
“in any way connected with any negligent act or omission" of
CH2M’s work on the project. The duty to indemnify and the duty to
defend are separate and distinct obligations. Thus, CH2M’s duty to
defend was triggered when “any claim against UDC implicated CH2M’s
performance of its role in the project…when the HOA alleged harm
resulting from deficient work that was within the scope of services for
which UDC had retained CH2M.” It was irrelevant that the HOA had not
alleged negligence on the part of CH2M. The Court reasoned that an
“indemnitee should not have to rely on the plaintiff to name a
particular subcontractor or consultant in order to obtain a promised
defense by the one the indemnitee believes is responsible for the
plaintiff’s damages.”
Comment:
The court’s opinion necessarily is based on the contract
language, leaving open how changing the wording might alter the design
professional's defense obligation so that it is only triggered by a
finding of negligence on the part of the design professional. The court
placed some emphasis on the fact that the "indemnity" language
(which is triggered if CH2M is found negligent) was separate from the
"defense" language, which is more ambiguous and applies to
"any claim or demand covered herein." For example,
would a provision that reads that the design professional must
"defend and indemnify" the developer for "any claims to
the extent caused by any negligent act or omission" by the design
professional trigger an immediate defense obligation on the part of the
design professional? In this example, the "defense" obligation
is specifically linked to a finding of negligence, so counsel for the
design professional would be able to argue that the "defense"
obligation would only arise at the end of the case, after a jury
determined that the design professional is negligent.
On the other hand, the
court included language in its opinion that may suggest that the design
professional's obligation to provide a defense to the developer would be
immediate even if specifically linked to a negligence finding. Here, the
court stated,
If "any claim or demand covered herein"
refers back to claims and demands identified in the indemnity clause, it
obviously cannot be premised on a proven "negligent act or
omission" by CH2MHill unless there is first a finding of such
negligence. As the trial
court pointed out, requiring such a determination would render
meaningless the defense obligation and contravene Civil Code section
2778 and the Supreme Court's admonition that a duty to defend arises out
of an indemnity obligation as soon as the litigation commences and
regardless of whether the indemnitor is ultimately found negligent.
The practical effect of the
decisions in Crawford and now UDC is
to further impact the availability of insurance since in these cases the
costs of defense frequently exceed the cost of repairs. In the case of
design professionals, many of the professional liability insurers argue
that their policies do not provide any coverage for the costs of
defending a client under a contractual indemnity provision in the
absence of evidence of professional negligence. If the obligation to
provide a defense is triggered at the time of the tender, the design
firm may be forced to bear this cost on its own without help from its
insurer.
The retroactive application
of the broad duty to defend standard of Crawford in the UDC
opinion renders it applicable to contracts entered into over
the past 10 years, at a time when most construction professionals, and
their attorneys and insurance brokers, had a different understanding of
the law. This is likely to drive the cost of “claims made”
professional liability insurance higher and result in many insurers
taking hard line positions against paying defense cost claims.
This decision will
negatively impact design professionals. This decision will only
encourage developers when sued to name “everyone who walked by the
project” with whom they have a contract arguing that they owe a
defense because the developer “believes [they are] responsible for the
plaintiff’s damages.” Designers with significant assets and the
financial strength to be selective may further withdraw from the
residential market except where they can negotiate around such duty to
defend clauses.
Although the court's
opinion is not yet final and may be modified, depublished, or reviewed
by the Supreme Court, UDC v CH2MHill is nonetheless
significant in its extension of Crawford directly to
design professionals and its broad interpretation of defense obligation
under the standard language typically found in owner/design professional
contracts. It remains to be seen whether these decisions lead to
legislative action or revisions to professional liability policies. In
the interim the Crawford and UDC decisions
may led to an expansion of Owner Controlled Insurance Programs (OCIP’s)
which include the design team or the use of Joint Defense Agreements.
Footnote:
(1) CH2M argued that it was entitled to attorney’s fees because
UDC failed to file a certificate of merit. California CCP § 411.35
requires counsel for a claimant alleging professional negligence against
an A/E to file and serve a certificate declaring that the attorney has
received an opinion from at least one A/E stating that there is
reasonable and meritorious cause for the suit. UDC had failed to comply
with the statute. However the Court of Appeals upheld the trial
court’s exercise of discretion in refusing to order an award of
attorneys fees because CH2M failed to show that the failure to file the
certificate caused CH2M any “further expense of any kind.”
About this Article:
Reprinted with Permission from Gordon & Rees, LLP,
Construction Law Update (January 2010).
For further information, contact Kenneth Strong, Esq., Gordon
Rees, 275 Battery Street; Suite
2000; San Francisco, CA 94111; Phone: (415) 986-590; KStrong@gordonrees.com;
http://www.gordonrees.com.
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Article
2
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Contractor Can Sue Architect on Quantum
Meruit Basis Where no Contract Exists
Lauren McLaughlin, Esq.
Briglia
McLaughlin, PLLC –
Vienna
,
VA
The Latin phrase “quantum
meruit” means “as much as he deserves” and is a legal theory
relied upon by those seeking to make another party liable for services
rendered in the absence of a contract.
Through this quasi-contract theory, the aggrieved party seeks to
be made whole for the benefits conferred upon that party.
In order to be successful on a quantum
meruit count, the plaintiff must show: (1) that a benefit was
conferred upon the defendant through plaintiff’s acts or services; (2)
that the defendant knew there was a reasonable expectation on the
plaintiff’s part that it would be paid for those services; and (3) the
reasonable value of its services. In a case from
New York
, an appellate division court did not follow the typical legal elements
of a quantum meruit count.
Instead, the court allowed a contractor to proceed with a lawsuit
against an architect, in the absence of a contract, even though the
contractor’s services were rendered on a project for the owner, who
was not a party to the lawsuit.
In Pulver
Roofing Company, Inc. v. SBLM Architects, P.C., a roofing company (Pulver)
was engaged by a school district (Owner) in
New York
to install a roof on a school. Under
its contract with the Owner, Pulver was required to install a roof in
accordance with plans provided by the architect (SBLM Architects).
The Owner rejected the roof and the parties entered into a
settlement agreement that allowed the roofer to perform remedial work.
After Pulver performed the work, it brought a lawsuit against
SBLM Architects alleging that the architect had ordered additional work
outside the scope of the settlement agreement but did not pay Pulver for
the extra work.
The architect moved to dismiss the quantum meruit
claim and the trial court granted the motion on the grounds that Pulver,
in performing extra work on the Project, necessarily conferred a benefit
on the project owner, not the architect.
On appeal, the court determined that Pulver had sufficiently
stated a cause of action for quantum meruit and let the suit go forward.
The appeals court relied on allegations in the complaint that
SBLM Architects promised Pulver it would be paid for its work.
The court made no distinction as to whether SBLM Architects
promised Pulver that the Owner would pay it for the work, as one
might expect. Clearly, the
architect would not typically finance extra work on the owner’s
project by paying the roofer. Astonishingly,
the court noted that even though the extra work was indeed for the
benefit of the Owner, Pulver was not required to establish that the
defendant actually received
the benefit; merely that the work was done at defendant’s behest.
The decision can fairly be characterized as an
aberration from how courts typically handle quantum meruit counts.
Rarely are contractors entitled to go forward with suits against
architects under a quasi-contractual theory.
According to this court, the contractor’s only legal burden
going forward is to establish: (1) that it performed work at the
architect’s request pursuant to a promise it would be paid; and (2)
the reasonable value of its work.
_________
Article
3
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Statute of Limitations for Negligence
Actions Bars Suit against Engineer that was based on Breach of Contract
Allegations
Kroger
Company brought suit against an engineering for breach of contract based
on allegations that the engineering service were “ineffective,
performed negligently, and their implementation caused additional
damages to the Kroger Store.”
Summary judgment was granted for the engineer finding that the
action was barred by the three year statute of limitations applicable to
tort (negligence) claims, even though the complaint was framed as breach
of contract, and the statute of limitations for breach of contract
actions was ten years. The
key to why the court applied the tort limitations period instead of the
contract limitations period was its finding that Kroger did not allege
breach of a specific contract
provision but rather that the engineer’s services were negligently
performed. “Thus,
Kroger’s petition states a cause of action for breach of a person’s
general duty to perform repair work in a non-negligent, prudent and
skillful manner.” In
concluding that the complaint was untimely filed, the court stated that
“The mere fact that the circumstances arose in the context of a
contractual relationship does not make the cause of action contractual.
The courts are not bound to accept a plaintiff’s
characterization of the nature of his cause of action if unsupported by
factual allegations.” Kroger
Company v. L.G. Barcus & Sons, Inc., et al, 13 So.3d 1232
(La.App.2 Cir. 2009).
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Article
4
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When Does a Notice from Client Become a
Claim that Must be Reported to Insurance Carrier?
J.
Kent Holland, Esq.
Where
a project developer sued its engineer that was responsible for the site
and grading plan, the engineer’s carrier refused to defend the suit
because it asserted the engineer had not provided notice of the claim
within the time permitted for reporting under the policy.
The developer wrote a letter to the engineer in March stating
that the engineer’s slope design failed to follow the recommendations
of a geotechnical report and therefore resulted in the parking not
draining. The letter
concluded by directing the engineer to “develop a plan to correct the
drainage problem.” The
engineer did not give notify its insurance carrier of this letter as a
“claim” against it but instead responded by letter to the developer
with an explanation that the problems were caused by defective
construction rather than defective design.
After follow-up meetings with the developer at which the causes
for the problem were reviewed, the engineer sent another letter
reiterating that the problem was caused by construction defects.
After receiving that letter the developer sent a second letter or
e-mail to the engineer in the month of May specifically accusing the
engineer of design error and chastising it for failure to “accept
responsibility.” Three
months later (August), the engineer advised its carrier that this May
correspondence by the developer constituted a “claim” against him.
Subsequently, the developer filed suit against the engineer as
well as the architect and contractor, and the engineer’s carrier
refused to defend the suit because the engineer didn’t give timely
notice of the claim as required by the policy.
The
engineer filed suit against the carrier in a separate action for alleged
breach of duty to defend it in the underlying litigation.
The court in this case (Matkin-Hoover Engineering, Inc. v. Everest National Insurance Company,
2009 WL 1457669 (W.D. Tex., 2009)) denied the insurance carrier’s
motion for summary judgment – meaning that the case will go forward on
its merits to determine whether the carrier properly declined to defend
the engineer.
The
issue of what communication from the developer to the engineer first
constituted a “claim” that the engineer must report to it carrier
was carefully analyzed by the court, but it seems to this author that
the decision failed to address a critical point and that if this case
goes forward on the merits the carrier may yet prove that it owed no
duty to defend the engineer in view of exclusions that may potentially
apply. (See Comments at the conclusion of this case note).
Policies
were issued by Everest Insurance to the engineer for the time period of
April 15, 2005 to April 15, 2006, and a renewal policy covered the
following twelve month period of April 15, 2006 to April 15, 2007.
When the engineer gave Everest notice of what it deemed to be
developer’s claim in August 2006, the second Everest policy was in
effect. Since the
developer’s March 2006 letter was written during the first policy
period, Everest argued that the claim occurred during that policy and
must be reported within 60 days of the end of that policy period.
This is the claim event that the carrier asserted the engineer
was required to report during the first policy period pursuant to the
requirement that for coverage to be triggered, “the claim arising out
of the wrongful acts is first made against any Insured during the policy
period” and the “the claim is reported in writing to [Everest] no
later than 60 days, after the end of the policy period. . . .
The
engineer argued that it was not until receipt of a May 19, 2006 letter
from the developer demanding that it pay to correct the defects in the
parking lot that it was clear that the Owner was making a claim against
him.
“Claim”
was defined in the policy as follows:
“Claim” means a demand for money or professional services received by the Insured for damages, including
but not limited to, the service of a lawsuit or the institution of
arbitration proceedings or other alternative dispute resolution
proceedings, alleging a wrongful
act arising out of the performance of professional
services.”
The
court explained that it found nothing about this definition to be
ambiguous. According to the
court,
[W]hether
a claim has been made on an insured doesn’t depend on whether a demand
is formal or informal—it depends on whether the communication
‘demand[s] . . . money or professional services . . . for damages . .
. [and] allege[es] a wrongful act arising out of the performance of
professional services.
As
further stated by the court, “The definition anticipates that
communications other than ‘the service of a lawsuit or the institution
of arbitration proceedings or other alternative dispute resolution
proceedings’—whether formal or informal-may implicate the duty to
defend. . . .” The
absence of words in the definition stating that that a “claim”
applies to informal proceedings is not a latent ambiguity, says the
court.
Having
determined that the language of the policy was not ambiguous, the judge
continued to evaluate the letter from the developer to determine whether
it fit within the definition of a “claim.”
In this regard, the court stated that this determination requires
a fact-specific analysis to be conducted on a case-by-case basis.
The inquiry “asks when circumstances known to the insured would
have suggested to a reasonable person the possibility of [a] claim.”
In
this case, the court considered the insurance company argument that a
reasonable person should have understood the letter to constitute a
claim because, according to the carrier, it demanded performance of
professional services to repair the drainage problem and alleged a
wrongful act arising out of the engineer’s performance of professional
services. In rejecting the
carrier’s argument, the court found that this characterization of the
letter was overstated and that “considering the circumstances known to
the insured, the letter did not necessarily suggest to a reasonable
person the possibility of a claim.”
There were several communications between the parties after
receipt of the March 2006 letter, culminating in a letter from the
engineer to the developer dated May 18, 2006 reporting the results of a
“comprehensive as-built survey” showing how the road as built by the
contractor did not meet the engineer’s plans and specifications.
Upon receipt of that letter, the developer responded by letter
dated May 19, stating, “Your letter contains suggestions to correct
the problem but you did not discuss the costs, [make] any attempt to
determine the costs, or how to pay for the costs.
You simply dumped your suggestions on my laps [sic], which I
interpret to mean that you have refused to accept responsibility for
your design error. Do I read
you correctly?
Until
receipt of this letter, the court stated “a reasonable person could
have believed that [the developer] had not decided who caused the
drainage problem. . . I
agree with [Engineer’s] position that the [first letter] ‘could be
reasonably regarded not as a demand but as a request for additional
engineering services to help correct a construction defect for which
[the engineer] was not responsible and for which it thought, at the
time, it would be paid.” The
fact that the developer eventually sued everybody (including the
engineer, architect and contractor) supports the engineer’s argument
that the developer was uncertain about who was responsible for the
problem.
The
final focus of the court’s discussion addressed whether the fact that
the first letter from the developer demanded professional services
constituted a “claim” since the definition refers to a demand for
professional services as being a possible claim.
Although the letter demanded professional services, the court
found “the letter did not demand professional services for damages as
the definition of ‘claim’ requires.”
This is the important distinction that the entire decision rests
upon. The court summed
up as follows:
The
[developer] letter does not suggest that [Developer] expected [Engineer]
to pay an amount which [Engineer] was legally obligated to pay for a
covered claim. A reasonable
person may likely have viewed the [Developer] letter as [Engineer] says
it did—as a request for additional engineering services to fix the
drainage problem for which it would be paid.
Because a reasonable person may not have viewed the letter as a
demand for professional services for damages, a question of fact exists,
precluding summary judgment.”
Comment: It
is not uncommon for problems to arise on a project where there is
uncertainty or dispute over who is responsible for defects in the
project as constructed. The
construction contractor might not have met the plans and specifications.
Or the architect or engineer may not have met the standard of
care is drafting the plans and specifications.
Or there could be shared responsibility for the problem if it is
determined that the problem was caused by a combination of defective
plans and specifications as well as defective construction work.
The claim notice issue that confronts design professionals is
when does it become necessary to report a matter as a claim if the
professional believes the problem is created solely by defective
construction work, and that the contractor is inappropriately asserting
that the design professional is at fault.
This can be a difficult judgment call.
Design professionals may not want to report every contractor
change order demand as a claim under their professional liability policy
merely because the contractor has alleged a basket or reasons for
entitlement, including some tenuous argument of design error.
On the other hand, what happens if a party with standing to make
a claim (such as the project owner/client) eventually makes a written
demand or files a suit against the design professional?
Will the claim be denied by the insurance carrier as untimely
because it was not reported when the design professional first became
aware of the issue?
To
reduce the risk design professionals have in missing deadlines for
reporting claims, professional
liability carriers generally include language in their policies
permitting what is known as “circumstance” reporting.
This permits the insured to report any incident that it
reasonably believes may become a claim against it.
The policy in effect when the
“circumstance” is reported to the carrier is the one that
will ultimately be responsible for responding to a “claim” if such
claim eventually results from that “circumstance.”
In the case reported in this article, if circumstance reporting
was permitted, then even if the engineer had not recognized the letter
from its client as a claim, it could have reported it to its carrier as
a “circumstance” and thereby preserved coverage under the 2005-2006
year policy even though the law suit was not filed until a subsequent
year’s policy was in effect.
Recognizing
claims, and timely reporting them to the carrier, is important as
demonstrated by this case. It
can become even more of an issue if the policy was not renewed with the
same carrier but was instead replaced with a different insurance
company’s policy. The
application for insurance requires the applicant to identify any known
claims or known situations that could reasonably become claims.
If a few months after changing carriers an Insured gives its new
carrier a claim to defend, that carrier is going to want to know when
the Insured first knew the circumstances giving rise to that claim –
and may deny the claim if it determines that knowledge of the claim
pre-existed the issuance of the new policy.
If that happens, the Insured could be stuck in the middle—with
no coverage under either its old policy or the new policy—since it
didn’t report the matter to the old carrier within the required time
frame permitted for filing claims under that policy.
_________
Article
5
__________
Economic Loss Doctrine in Pennsylvania Bars Owner’s Negligence Claim
against Designers and Construction Subcontractors
Where
retaining walls for the foundation of a food distribution center began
to evidence stress and potential failure, the building owner filed a
suit against various design firms, contractors and subcontractors that
had been involved in the design, inspection, testing and construction of
the retaining walls – based on allegations of negligence.
The U.S. District, applying
Pennsylvania
law, held that the owner’s negligence claims were barred by the
economic loss doctrine because
the claims related to the cost of repairing and replacing the walls and
did not allege any physical injury to any person or damage to property
other than the retaining walls.
In
the decision in American Stores
Properties v. Spotts, Stevens & McCoy, 2009 WL 2513437 (U.S.D.C.,
E.D.Pa 2009), the plaintiff offered three different arguments against
application of the economic loss doctrine -
each of which was rejected by the Court.
Plaintiff argued that (1) the
doctrine can only be applied where there is privity of contract between
the parties; (2) the doctrine is not to be applied when dealing with
professionals whose information is to be relied upon by others in the
industry (citing Bilt-Rite Contractors v. Architectural Studio
(Pa. 2005); and (3) property damage had been suffered.
The District Court dealt concisely with each of these arguments
finding the following:
1)
Privity of contract is not required for application of the
economic loss doctrine to negligence claims.
“Even where the parties are not in privity of contract,
Pennsylvania
law does not recognize a cause of action based on negligent acts that
result in only economic loss.”
The court cited several
Pennsylvania
state court decisions holding that negligence claims against contractors
were barred despite the absence of a contractual relationship.
As stated in one of the cited decisions, “Purely economic loss,
when not accompanied with or occasioned by injury, is considered beyond
the scope of recovery even if a direct result of the negligent act.”
2)
The Bilt-Rite case
cited by the plaintiff was not relevant because it concerned negligent
misrepresentation claims against a design firm and the holding of that
case was that the economic loss doctrine would not apply to negligent
misrepresentation claims under Section 522 of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts (1977). The
Court explained that the Bilt-Rite holding
only applies in the situation where a plaintiff relies on
“expert supplier of information” with whom it has not contract, and
that courts have further restricted the holding of Bilt-Rite to
negligent misrepresentation claims under Section 522.
3)
Plaintiff suffered no damage to “other property.”
The plaintiff tried to argue that soils reports and other
services were the defective “product” and that his in turn caused
damage to the retaining wall which were “other property.”
In rejecting that argument, the court found the retaining walls
were the “product” for which the plaintiff bargained and damages to
the wall were therefore subject to the economic loss doctrine.
The court pointed out that if the plaintiff had alleged damage to
goods or inventory that was stored in the food distribution center,
recovery for that damage would not be barred by the economic loss
doctrine since it would indeed be damage to “other property.”
“However, in this case, the retaining wall is the relevant
product that was bargained for by Plaintiff.
There is simply no ‘other property’ at issue.”
Since the plaintiff did not allege damages other than those
related to the cost of repairing or replacing the walls, the court
concluded that recovery was barred under the economic loss doctrine.
=====================================
ABOUT THIS NEWSLETTER & A DISCLAIMER
About the author: All articles
in this issue of the ConstructionRisk.Com Report are written by
J. Kent Holland, a construction lawyer located in Tysons Corner,
Virginia, with a national practice (formerly with Wickwire Gavin,
P.C. and now with Construction Risk Counsel, PLLC) representing design
professionals, contractors and project owners. He is also founder
and president of ConstructionRisk, LLC, a consulting firm providing
consulting services to owners, design professionals, contractors and
attorneys on construction projects. He is publisher of
ConstructionRisk.com Report and may be reached at Kent@ConstructionRisk.com
or by calling 703-623-1932. This article is published in
ConstructionRisk.com Report, Vol. 12 No. 1 (January 2010).
This newsletter Report is published and edited by J. Kent Holland,
Jr., J.D. The Report is independent of any insurance company,
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Copyright 2010, ConstructionRisk, LLC
Publisher & Editor:
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Jr., Esq.
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