A pickup truck was traveling too fast on an icy, divided interstate highway and suddenly lost control, hurtled across a 42-foot-wide median, and collided with an 18-wheeler before the defendant had time to react. The collision killed one of the pickup’s occupants and severely injured three others. A lower court found that the car driver was not solely responsible for the injuries, but that the driver of the18 wheeler was also liable because even though he was driving less than the speed limit the accident would not have happened if he had been going slower and could have stopped his vehicle before crashing with the car that crossed into its lane.
This was reversed by the Supreme Court of Texas in a decision holding that the 18 wheeler was not the proximate cause of the accident and therefore could have no liability, explaining:
“Proximate cause is not established merely by proof that the injury would not have happened if not for thedefendant’s negligence. Instead, proximate cause requires, among other things, proof that the defendant’snegligence was a substantial factor in causing the injury. The substantial-factor requirement incorporates “the idea of responsibility” into the question of causation. Thus, even if the defendant’s negligence is part ofthe causal chain of events that led to the injury, the defendant is not liable if his involvement was a mere “happenstance of place and time.” Instead, the substantial-factor requirement means that liability falls only on a party whose substantial role in bringing about the injury is such that he is “actually responsible for the ultimate harm.” Liability does not fall on other participants in the causal chain whose actions merely “created the condition which made the injury possible.” Werner Enterprises, Inc. and Shiraz A. Ali v. Jennifer Blake, Texas Supreme Court, (No. 23-0493, 2025.
The court stated the plaintiffs proved at trial that the accident likely would not have occurred or the injuries would have been less severe, if not for the 18-wheeler’s speed, which was below the speed limit but still unsafe for the icy conditions. The court concluded, however
“that this proof is insufficient to establish that the defendant’s negligence was a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiffs’ injuries. The defendant’s presence on the highway, combined with his speed, furnished the condition that made the injuries possible, but it did not proximately cause the injuries.Rather, the sole proximate cause of this accident and these injuries—the sole substantial factor to whichthe law permits assignment of liability—was the sudden, unexpected hurtling of the victims’ vehicle into oncoming highway traffic, for which the defendants bore no responsibility.”
The court concluded that this proof is insufficient to establish that the defendant’s negligence was a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiffs’ injuries. The defendant’s presence on the highway, combined with his speed, furnished the condition that made the injuries possible, but it did not proximately cause the injuries. Rather, the sole proximate cause of this accident and these injuries—the sole substantial factor to which the law permits assignment of liability—was the sudden, unexpected hurtling of the victims’ vehicle into oncoming highway traffic, for which the defendants bore no responsibility.”
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Cause in fact has two components: (1) “but-for” causation, and (2) “substantial-factor” causation. Id. The defendant’s negligence is the “but-for” cause of an injury if, “without the act or omission, the harm would not have occurred.” Id. (quoting Gunn v. McCoy, 554 S.W.3d 645, 658 (Tex. 2018)). But-for causation is essential to liability, but proving but-for causation alone does not establish that the defendant’s negligence was a cause in fact of the plaintiff’s injuries. “[I]t is not enough that the harm would not have occurred had the actor not been negligent.” Lear Siegler, 819 S.W.2d at 472 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 cmt. a). The plaintiff must also prove that “the [negligent] act or omission was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury.”
… If [ ]the defendant’s conduct “merely creates the condition that makes the harm possible, it is not a substantial factor in causing the harm as a matter of law.” *** In other words, “cause in fact is not established where the defendant’s negligence does no more than furnish a condition which makes the injuries possible.”
The court concluded that in this case, “no reasonable juror could assign responsibility for these injuries to anyone other than the driver who lost control of his vehicle and hurtled across a 42-foot median into oncoming highway traffic, thereby causing this accident and these injuries in every legally relevant sense of the word.”
Comment:
This decision reaches a well-reasoned conclusion. I believe there are many cases in which a party is injured due to their own negligence that was the proximate cause of his or her injuries, but then they successfully sue someone else arguing that such party was also at fault and should pay damages.
About the author: Article written by J. Kent Holland, Jr., a construction lawyer located in Tysons Corner, Virginia, with a national practice (formerly with Wickwire Gavin, P.C. and now with ConstructionRisk Counsel, PLLC) representing design professionals, contractors and project owners. He is founder and president of a consulting firm, ConstructionRisk, LLC, providing consulting services to owners, design professionals, contractors and attorneys on construction projects. He is publisher of ConstructionRisk Report and may be reached at Kent@ConstructionRisk.com or by calling 703-623-1932. This article is published in ConstructionRisk Report, Vol. 27, No. 6 (October 2025).
Copyright 2025, ConstructionRisk, LLC
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