A contract contained numerous complicated indemnification clauses which the court interpreted to broadly permit the Indemnitee (Contractor) to be indemnified for damages resulting from its own negligence. Such broad indemnity is not permissible under the law of the state unless the intention of such indemnity is expressed in “clear and unequivocal terms.” Here, the court held that that intent was not expressed and, therefore, held that Contractor was unable to assert the benefit of being indemnified. The Retreat at Charleston v. Pohlman Quality Contractors, South Carolina Court of Appeals, Case No. 2021-001050 (2025).
In this case, the plaintiff’s complaint against the contractor alleged “The deficiencies and defects which exist at the Project are the proximate and direct result of the negligence and/orgross negligence of the Subcontractor Defendants [BFS and Respondents], and each of them individually, in one or more of the following particulars:” The court stated that “The particulars of negligence alleged at subparts b, c, d, g, and i speak to BFS’s duties in its roleas a supplier of Project materials as well as the duties of BFS and any subcontractors responsible for supervising, inspecting, and approving the work.”
In opposition to the summary judgment motion, the contractor argued that it was not attempting be indemnified for damages resulting from its own negligence – even if the contract might be worded to permit such indemnification. The court reviewed the pleadings, however, and determine that the contractor was, indeed, seeking such broad indemnity.
The court stated:
“BFS alleges in its contractual indemnification claims, as well as in conjunction with other claims not at issueon appeal, that it seeks recovery for any sums for which BFS may be held liable to the Plaintiffs or others, in addition to attorneys’ fees and costs from Respondents.In our view, the wording of paragraphs 138 and 168 leaves little doubt that BFS’s pleadings also seek indemnification for its own negligence.”
The court reviewed indemnity sections out of multiple contracts involved in this matter and found them to be ambiguous. The court stated, for example:
“We view the language in Section 6 as inherentlyconfusing insofar as it calls for the 2005 Subcontractors to indemnify BFS for BFS’s sole negligence while alsoclaiming to limit the indemnity “to the extent” of the 2005 Subcontractors’ own negligence. Thus, we agree with the circuit court that the language contained in the indemnity clause does not clearly and unequivocally provide for indemnity for BFS’s own negligence.Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s rulings that the indemnity provisions of the 2005 Contracts are neither clear nor unequivocal, and that BFS’s contractual indemnity claims against Palmetto and East Coast fail as a matter of law.”
The contractor argued that the lower court erred in finding the contractual language permitting the contractor to recover for its subcontractor’s negligence violates the South Carolina Code and public policy. The appellate court agreed with the lower court. It explained:
The statute at issue provides, in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a promise oragreement in connection with the design, planning, construction, alteration, repair or maintenance of a building, structure, highway, road, appurtenance or appliance, including moving, demolition and excavating, purporting to indemnify the promisee, its independent contractors, agents, employees, or indemnitees against liability for damages arising out of bodily injury or property damageproximately caused by or resulting from the solenegligence of the promisee, its independent contractors, agents, employees, or indemnitees is against public policy and unenforceable. Nothing contained in this section shall affect a promise or agreement whereby the promisor shall indemnify or hold harmless the promisee or the promisee’sindependent contractors, agents, employees or indemnitees against liability for damages resulting from the negligence, inwhole or in part, of the promisor, its agents or employees.S.C.Code Ann. § 32-2-10 (emphasis added).
The problem for the Contractor, here, however, was that although the statute allowed it to be indemnified for damages caused by its subcontractors, the actual contracts in question contained multiple sections requiring the subcontractors to indemnify or defend the contractor for damages resulting from the Contractor’s sole negligence. Explaining this further, the Court stated:
“For example, Section 6 calls for the 2005 Subcontractors to unconditionally defend and indemnify BFS in subsection (b)(1) and then calls for the 2005 Subcontractors to indemnify BFS for BFS’s failure to supervise in subsection (b)(2). These provisions violate § 32-2-10 because they seek to require the2005 Subcontractors to indemnify BFS for its solenegligence…. And, Section 8(i) of the 2005 Contracts provides for indemnification of attorney’s fees and expenses as well as amounts paid in settlement without regard to BFS’s fault. Therefore, we affirm the circuit court’s findings as to the public policy and statutory questions.
The court went further and also found the contract to be unconscionable and unenforceable as a contract of adhesion. The court stated: “[U]nder generalprinciples of state contract law, an adhesion contract is a standard form contract offered on a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ basis with terms that are not negotiable.”
The court stated:
“The Later Subcontractors installed products for BFS, the regional division of Builders FirstSource, arguably a sophisticated drafter of contracts given its regional reachand its multiple subcontractor contracts on severalLowcountry projects. As discussed in sections I and II,supra, the warranty, guaranty, and indemnity provisions ofthe Later Contracts violate § 32-2-10, are ambiguous,conflict with each other, and do not meet the clear and unequivocal standard articulated in Concord & Cumberland.
The disparity in bargaining power along with the ambiguous terms in these adhesion contracts deprived the Later Subcontractors of any meaningful choice whenentering the Later Contracts. The Later Contracts give thedrafter expansive rights and remedies, while creating oppressive obligations or liabilities for the Later Subcontractors and limiting or waiving their rights. We find it inconceivable that a subcontractor with even asemblance of bargaining power who understood the implications of the language in these agreements would sign them unless there existed a total absence of meaningfulchoice. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s findings that the pertinent provisions of the Later Contracts are unconscionable and unenforceable as a matter of law.”
Comments: The court decision is quite long (30 pages) and quotes at length from the contract documents, which contain a unusual number of different indemnification clauses – many of them quite complex. When our firm reviews the indemnity provisions in proposed contracts we try to redline them to make them clear and unambiguous. For design contracts where the designer’s professional liability policy includes an exclusion for damages arising out of “contractual liability” such as indemnification clauses, we make it clear that the indemnity is only for damages to the extent caused by the design professionals’ negligence. We also state that the indemnity does not include a duty to defend against professional liability claims. Here is an example clause we sometimes recommend:
“Consultant shall defend (except against professional liability claims) indemnify and hold harmless the Client, its officers, directors, and employees (“Indemnitees”) from and against third party claims, demands and lawsuits (“Claims”) and the damages and costs (including reasonable attorney’s fees and cost of defense) arising out of such Claims to the extent caused by the negligent act, error or omission of the Consultant or anyone for whom the Consultant is legally responsible, subject to any limitations of liability contained in this Agreement.”
About the author: Article written by J. Kent Holland, Jr., a construction lawyer located in Tysons Corner, Virginia, with a national practice (formerly with Wickwire Gavin, P.C. and now with ConstructionRisk Counsel, PLLC) representing design professionals, contractors and project owners. He is founder and president of a consulting firm, ConstructionRisk, LLC, providing consulting services to owners, design professionals, contractors and attorneys on construction projects. He is publisher of ConstructionRisk Report and may be reached at Kent@ConstructionRisk.com or by calling 703-623-1932. This article is published in ConstructionRisk Report, Vol. 28, No. 7 (November 2026).
Copyright 2026, ConstructionRisk, LLC

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