Inside this Issue
- A1 - Waiver of Consequential Damages Clause not Incorporated by Reference into Design Contract
- A2 - Contractor Can’t be Indemnified for its Own Negligence Unless the Contract Expresses that Intent in Clear and Unequivocal Terms
Article 1
Waiver of Consequential Damages Clause not Incorporated by Reference into Design Contract
See similar articles: consequential | direct damages | Incorporation by Reference | waiver consequential damages
Project owner filed a breach of contract complaint against its architect concerning design and placement of sewer lines at an apartment complex. The Owner sought summary judgment to determine that the waiver of consequential damages clause in the AIA A201-2007 General Conditions was not incorporated by reference into the AIA Document B108-2009 Design Contract. It also sought judgment that the damages it sought are “direct” damages and not “consequential” damages waived under the contract. The court granted the motion as to the incorporation by reference and held that the definition of consequential damages was not incorporated by reference because it was not an actual “term” but rather just a “provision” or “article.” On the question of whether the damages sought are waived pursuant by the more abbreviated clause waiver of consequential damages clause in the Design contract, the court stated it was premature to determine that because factual discovery needed to be completed to assist the court in rendering in legal decision on whether the damages are direct or consequential. Vista v. BSB Design, Case No. 7:24-cv-822 (U.S. District Court, Western District, Virginia (2025)
The Owner and Designer entered into AIA Document B108-2009 for design andarchitectural services on the project. That contract contained a waiver of consequential damages clause providing the following
“The Architect and Owner waive consequential damages for claims, disputes or other matters in question arising out of or relating to this Agreement. This mutual waiver is applicable, without limitation, to all consequential damages due to either party’s termination of this Agreement, except as specifically provided in Section 9.7.”
Another section of that contract stated “[t]erms in this Agreement shall have the same meaning as those in AIA Document A201-2007, General Conditions of the Contract forConstruction.”1
AIA Document A201-2017 (“Branch contract”).2 A waiver of consequential damages in the General Conditions provides in pertinent part the following:
“§ 15.1.7 Waiver of Claims for Consequential Damages
The Contractor and Owner waive Claims against each other for consequential damages arising out of or relating to this Contract. This mutual waiver includes
- damages incurred by the Owner for rental expenses, for losses of use, income, profit, financing, business and reputation, and for loss of management or employee productivity or of the services of such persons; and
- damages incurred by the Contractor for principal office expenses including the compensation of personnel stationed there, for losses of financing, business and reputation, and for loss of profit except anticipated profit arising directly from the Work.”
The General Conditions includes a General Provision on capitalization of terms:
“§ 1.3 Capitalization
Terms capitalized in these General Conditions include those that are (1) specifically defined, (2) the titles of numbered articles, or (3) the titles of other documents published by the American Institute of Architects.”
The Designer asserted that the consequential damages waiver in § 10.2 of theGeneral Conditions of the Contract for Construction of the Branch contract is a “term” incorporated into the BSB Design agreement (“[t]erms in [the BSB Design] Agreement shall have the same meaning as those in [the Branch contract]”). In opposition, the Owner asserted that the waiver of consequential damages in the Branch contract is not a “term”and is therefore not incorporated into the BSB Design agreement.
Section 10.2 of the BSB Design agreement states that “[t]erms in this Agreement shall have the same meaning as those in AIA Document 201-2007, General Conditions ofthe Contract for Construction.” Owner argued that the word “Terms” in this provisionnecessarily refers only to defined, capitalized terms in the Branch contract. Defendants argue that § 10.2 is not limited to “defined” or “capitalized” terms, but rather incorporatesthe meaning of “terms” from the Branch contract generally, including provision § 15.1.7waiving consequential damages. The trial judge found that under the plain language of the contracts, the consequential damages waiver provision is not a “term” in the Branch contract, and is not incorporated into the BSB Design agreement.
The structure of the two documents, said the court, reflects that the meaning of the terms capitalized and defined in the General Conditions are the same when capitalized, but undefined, in the Design agreement. The court observed: “If § 10.2 is read so broadly as to adopt all “terms” of the Branch contract, without limitation on what constitutes a term, the provision would essentially incorporate the entire Branch contract and render superfluous any similar or competing provisions of the BSB Design agreement.” Further, the partieswould make express any intent to incorporate the meaning of all words and provisions of the Branch contract. But, they did not do so.
The court stated:
“[T]]he phrase “consequential damages” is not a contractual term. Rather, consequential damages are a legal concept comprised of different components, depending on the applicable jurisdiction. The waiver of consequential damages itself is a legal provision, not a capitalized, defined term. Notably, § 10.2 adopts the meaning of “terms”and not “provisions,” or “articles.”
Further, the phrase “consequential damages” is not capitalized or defined in the General Conditions. Giving the unambiguous language of both contracts their plain meaning, theconsequential damages waiver in the Branch contract [General Conditions] is a legalprovision and not a “term” whose meaning is incorporated into the [ ] Design agreement.”
The court concluded that the consequential damages waiver provision § 8.1.3 in the Design agreement is its own stand-alone provision and, therefore, grant partial summary judgment to the Owner on this narrow issue of contractual interpretation.
With regard to the request for summary judgment to declare the damages claimed are consequential under the definition of the Design Contract and therefore waived, the court declined to grant judgment. The Owner argued that it claims direct damages under Virginia law for “1) payment for extended builders risk insurance; 2) payment for its general conditions extension; 3) payment for mortgage insurance premium; 4) payment for additional loan interest; 5) payment for loan extension penalties; and 6) lost rent due to the delayed opening of the project” are all direct damages because they flow naturally from the asserted breach of contract.
The court stated “Whether damages are direct or consequential is a question of law. This determination is not based upon the actual understanding and foreseeability of theparties in a particular situation, but rather, is an objective question of whether the damages “flow ordinarily and expectedly” from a breach of contract, are “ordinarily predictable” under construction industry standards, or can be expected to result from a breach ofcontract in the ordinary course of human experience.”
“The facts of a particular case inform whether the damages at issue are of the type that, in the ordinary course of human experience, or in the applicable industry, would beexpected to result from a breach. Accordingly, the cases addressing the distinction between direct and consequential damages in the construction context do so after the benefit of factual development.” In denying summary judgment on this issue, the court stated that the Owner may renew its motion “at the conclusion of discovery.”
Comment ONE: When including a waiver of consequential damages clause in a contract we recommend making the definition broader, similar to what was included in the General Conditions in this case. Here is an example of such a clause we sometime recommend:
“Mutual Waiver of Consequential Damages. Consultant and Client waive all consequential or special damages, including, but not limited to, loss of use, profits, revenue, business opportunity, or production, for claims, disputes, or other matters arising out of or relating to the Contract or the services provided by Consultant, regardless of whether such claim or dispute is based upon breach of contract, willful misconduct or negligent act or omission of either of them or their employees, agents, subcontractors, or other legal theory, even if the affected party has knowledge of the possibility of such damages. This mutual waiver shall survive termination or completion of this Contract.”
Comment TWO: Incorporation by Reference. The court’s analysis here is interesting. Regardless of whether other courts will interpret similar contract language in the same manner as was done by this court, we recommend that design firms make specific exceptions to what is being incorporated into the contract by a generic or standard incorporation by reference. We recommend doing something like this: At the conclusion of whatever flow down clause the subcontract has (particularly if there is a long prime contract that might contain uninsurable warranties or indemnity obligations, add the following to do a disclaimer of warranties and Indemnitees:
“… provided however that the Standard of Care and the Indemnification provisions set forth in this Subcontract Agreement take precedence over any conflicting provisions in the Contract between Prime and its Client and any other documents.”
This seems like a reasonable compromise to avoid liability from uninsurable indemnity and standard of care clauses that the Prime may have agreed to in its prime agreement.
About the author: Article written by J. Kent Holland, Jr., a construction lawyer located in Tysons Corner, Virginia, with a national practice (formerly with Wickwire Gavin, P.C. and now with ConstructionRisk Counsel, PLLC) representing design professionals, contractors and project owners. He is founder and president of a consulting firm, ConstructionRisk, LLC, providing consulting services to owners, design professionals, contractors and attorneys on construction projects. He is publisher of ConstructionRisk Report and may be reached at Kent@ConstructionRisk.com or by calling 703-623-1932. This article is published in ConstructionRisk Report, Vol. 28, No. 7 (November 2026).
Copyright 2026, ConstructionRisk, LLC
Article 2
Contractor Can’t be Indemnified for its Own Negligence Unless the Contract Expresses that Intent in Clear and Unequivocal Terms
See similar articles: Indemnification clause
A contract contained numerous complicated indemnification clauses which the court interpreted to broadly permit the Indemnitee (Contractor) to be indemnified for damages resulting from its own negligence. Such broad indemnity is not permissible under the law of the state unless the intention of such indemnity is expressed in “clear and unequivocal terms.” Here, the court held that that intent was not expressed and, therefore, held that Contractor was unable to assert the benefit of being indemnified. The Retreat at Charleston v. Pohlman Quality Contractors, South Carolina Court of Appeals, Case No. 2021-001050 (2025).
In this case, the plaintiff’s complaint against the contractor alleged “The deficiencies and defects which exist at the Project are the proximate and direct result of the negligence and/orgross negligence of the Subcontractor Defendants [BFS and Respondents], and each of them individually, in one or more of the following particulars:” The court stated that “The particulars of negligence alleged at subparts b, c, d, g, and i speak to BFS's duties in its roleas a supplier of Project materials as well as the duties of BFS and any subcontractors responsible for supervising, inspecting, and approving the work.”
In opposition to the summary judgment motion, the contractor argued that it was not attempting be indemnified for damages resulting from its own negligence – even if the contract might be worded to permit such indemnification. The court reviewed the pleadings, however, and determine that the contractor was, indeed, seeking such broad indemnity.
The court stated:
“BFS alleges in its contractual indemnification claims, as well as in conjunction with other claims not at issueon appeal, that it seeks recovery for any sums for which BFS may be held liable to the Plaintiffs or others, in addition to attorneys' fees and costs from Respondents.In our view, the wording of paragraphs 138 and 168 leaves little doubt that BFS's pleadings also seek indemnification for its own negligence.”
The court reviewed indemnity sections out of multiple contracts involved in this matter and found them to be ambiguous. The court stated, for example:
“We view the language in Section 6 as inherentlyconfusing insofar as it calls for the 2005 Subcontractors to indemnify BFS for BFS's sole negligence while alsoclaiming to limit the indemnity "to the extent" of the 2005 Subcontractors' own negligence. Thus, we agree with the circuit court that the language contained in the indemnity clause does not clearly and unequivocally provide for indemnity for BFS's own negligence.Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's rulings that the indemnity provisions of the 2005 Contracts are neither clear nor unequivocal, and that BFS's contractual indemnity claims against Palmetto and East Coast fail as a matter of law.”
The contractor argued that the lower court erred in finding the contractual language permitting the contractor to recover for its subcontractor’s negligence violates the South Carolina Code and public policy. The appellate court agreed with the lower court. It explained:
The statute at issue provides, in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a promise oragreement in connection with the design, planning, construction, alteration, repair or maintenance of a building, structure, highway, road, appurtenance or appliance, including moving, demolition and excavating, purporting to indemnify the promisee, its independent contractors, agents, employees, or indemnitees against liability for damages arising out of bodily injury or property damageproximately caused by or resulting from the solenegligence of the promisee, its independent contractors, agents, employees, or indemnitees is against public policy and unenforceable. Nothing contained in this section shall affect a promise or agreement whereby the promisor shall indemnify or hold harmless the promisee or the promisee'sindependent contractors, agents, employees or indemnitees against liability for damages resulting from the negligence, inwhole or in part, of the promisor, its agents or employees.S.C.Code Ann. § 32-2-10 (emphasis added).
The problem for the Contractor, here, however, was that although the statute allowed it to be indemnified for damages caused by its subcontractors, the actual contracts in question contained multiple sections requiring the subcontractors to indemnify or defend the contractor for damages resulting from the Contractor’s sole negligence. Explaining this further, the Court stated:
“For example, Section 6 calls for the 2005 Subcontractors to unconditionally defend and indemnify BFS in subsection (b)(1) and then calls for the 2005 Subcontractors to indemnify BFS for BFS's failure to supervise in subsection (b)(2). These provisions violate § 32-2-10 because they seek to require the2005 Subcontractors to indemnify BFS for its solenegligence…. And, Section 8(i) of the 2005 Contracts provides for indemnification of attorney's fees and expenses as well as amounts paid in settlement without regard to BFS's fault. Therefore, we affirm the circuit court's findings as to the public policy and statutory questions.
The court went further and also found the contract to be unconscionable and unenforceable as a contract of adhesion. The court stated: "[U]nder generalprinciples of state contract law, an adhesion contract is a standard form contract offered on a 'take-it-or-leave-it' basis with terms that are not negotiable."
The court stated:
“The Later Subcontractors installed products for BFS, the regional division of Builders FirstSource, arguably a sophisticated drafter of contracts given its regional reachand its multiple subcontractor contracts on severalLowcountry projects. As discussed in sections I and II,supra, the warranty, guaranty, and indemnity provisions ofthe Later Contracts violate § 32-2-10, are ambiguous,conflict with each other, and do not meet the clear and unequivocal standard articulated in Concord & Cumberland.
The disparity in bargaining power along with the ambiguous terms in these adhesion contracts deprived the Later Subcontractors of any meaningful choice whenentering the Later Contracts. The Later Contracts give thedrafter expansive rights and remedies, while creating oppressive obligations or liabilities for the Later Subcontractors and limiting or waiving their rights. We find it inconceivable that a subcontractor with even asemblance of bargaining power who understood the implications of the language in these agreements would sign them unless there existed a total absence of meaningfulchoice. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's findings that the pertinent provisions of the Later Contracts are unconscionable and unenforceable as a matter of law.”
Comments: The court decision is quite long (30 pages) and quotes at length from the contract documents, which contain a unusual number of different indemnification clauses – many of them quite complex. When our firm reviews the indemnity provisions in proposed contracts we try to redline them to make them clear and unambiguous. For design contracts where the designer’s professional liability policy includes an exclusion for damages arising out of “contractual liability” such as indemnification clauses, we make it clear that the indemnity is only for damages to the extent caused by the design professionals’ negligence. We also state that the indemnity does not include a duty to defend against professional liability claims. Here is an example clause we sometimes recommend:
“Consultant shall defend (except against professional liability claims) indemnify and hold harmless the Client, its officers, directors, and employees ("Indemnitees") from and against third party claims, demands and lawsuits (“Claims”) and the damages and costs (including reasonable attorney’s fees and cost of defense) arising out of such Claims to the extent caused by the negligent act, error or omission of the Consultant or anyone for whom the Consultant is legally responsible, subject to any limitations of liability contained in this Agreement.”
About the author: Article written by J. Kent Holland, Jr., a construction lawyer located in Tysons Corner, Virginia, with a national practice (formerly with Wickwire Gavin, P.C. and now with ConstructionRisk Counsel, PLLC) representing design professionals, contractors and project owners. He is founder and president of a consulting firm, ConstructionRisk, LLC, providing consulting services to owners, design professionals, contractors and attorneys on construction projects. He is publisher of ConstructionRisk Report and may be reached at Kent@ConstructionRisk.com or by calling 703-623-1932. This article is published in ConstructionRisk Report, Vol. 28, No. 7 (November 2026).
Copyright 2026, ConstructionRisk, LLC

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